{"id":2540979,"date":"2025-03-13T11:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T11:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pokercoaching.com\/blog\/?p=2540979"},"modified":"2025-12-23T20:36:33","modified_gmt":"2025-12-23T20:36:33","slug":"get-max-value-with-the-second-nuts","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/pokercoaching.com\/blog\/get-max-value-with-the-second-nuts\/","title":{"rendered":"Get Max Value with the Second Nuts"},"content":{"rendered":"\"tournament<\/a>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s hard to make an extremely strong poker hand<\/a>. I mean, in hold\u2019em<\/em> it\u2019s hard to make a strong hand. In 5-card PLO, it\u2019s really easy \u2013 the problem is that your opponents find it just as easy, and sometimes make an even stronger hand.

But on those rare occasions in hold\u2019em when you do make a monster, you want to get full value for it. Here\u2019s a hand I witnessed a friend play \u2013 it\u2019s a good example of finding a balance get max value while avoiding a brick wall.<\/p>\n\n\n

\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/path><\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/path><\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\tTLDR:<\/strong>\u00a0See AI summary of this article.<\/span><\/div>

In a $5\/$5 no-limit Texas Hold\u2019em game, a player named Mark found himself holding the second-nut flush (A\u2660\ufe0f6\u2665\ufe0f) on a board with four spades. Facing a river check-raise from an opponent, Sam, Mark opted to just call, concerned about the possibility of a straight flush. However, analysis suggests that Mark missed an opportunity to extract maximum value.

Key Takeaways:<\/strong>
* Avoid Overestimating Rare Hands:<\/strong> While it’s possible an opponent holds the nuts, such as a straight flush, the probability is low. Overestimating this can lead to missed value opportunities.
* Recognize Opponent Tendencies:<\/strong> Sam’s check-raise on the river likely indicates a strong but not unbeatable hand. Players at lower stakes often overvalue hands like the king-high flush.
* Maximize Value When Ahead:<\/strong> With the second-nut flush, Mark was in a strong position. Instead of just calling, a re-raise could have capitalized on Sam’s likely overvalued hand.
* Don’t Fear the ‘Monsters Under the Bed’:<\/strong> Being overly cautious of rare hands can prevent optimal play. Trust in the odds and your read of the situation.

By understanding these principles, players can make more informed decisions and maximize value in similar situations.<\/p><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTable Of Contents\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
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  1. Setting the stage<\/a>
  2. Let\u2019s do some turn math<\/a>
  3. As played, to the river<\/a>
  4. The aftermath, and monsters under the bed<\/a>
  5. One hand, three lessons<\/a><\/ol>\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n\n\n

    Setting the stage<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    My friend Mark and I were playing a $5\/$5 no-limit Texas Hold’em<\/a> game (two cards, not five) in the Los Angeles area. We got into an interesting hand, by which I mean Mark got into an interesting hand \u2013 I don\u2019t remember what trash I folded. Mark was in the big blind, and his opponent in this hand was the small blind. We\u2019ll call the opponent \u201cSam\u201d for convenience. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Sam was relatively new to the table, and had intended to be in the smaller $3\/$5 game. But there were no seats in those games so he opted to stay in the $5\/$5 game. Already we have some information about Sam \u2013 he prefers to play smaller, and this may be somewhat out of his comfort\/expertise zone. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The hand begins with a classic L.A. set piece: four people limp, Sam limps in the small blind, and Mark wisely checks with A\u2660\ufe0f6\u2764\ufe0f in the big blind. Sam has run his $300 minimum buy-in up to $800. Mark covers him by a bit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In what is now known as \u201cTexas heads-up,\u201d they go six ways to the flop with $25 in the pot after the drop. The flop is 3\u2666\ufe0f-7\u2660\ufe0f-T\u2660\ufe0f. Sam and Mark both check, Mark planning to fold his cards at the first whisper of a bet. But that bet doesn\u2019t come as the flop checks all the way around. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The turn makes the board 3\u2666\ufe0f-7\u2660\ufe0f-T\u2660\ufe0f\u20132\u2660\ufe0f, and suddenly Mark is interested again. Again, Sam and Mark check, but this time the UTG player bets $20 into the $25 pot. A middle-position player calls the $20, the button calls, Sam calls in the small blind, and Mark calls too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"Setting<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

    Mark and I would later discuss this hand in excruciating detail over excellent bowls of ph\u1edf. This was the first decision point that I wanted to challenge. Did he consider check\/raising the turn? He, alone, knew where the nuts were. And the SPR was extremely high for a pot that went 38 ways to the flop. Suppose he made it $150 to go? Who would dare call such a raise? It sure looks like nobody has a very big hand \u2013 anybody who flopped better than one pair would certainly want to bet such a wet board.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    As I noted at the beginning: it\u2019s hard to make a monster, and Mark currently has ace-high. If he maximizes his fold equity<\/a> and makes it $150, he\u2019s risking $150 to win a $100 pot. His raise only has to win the pot 60% of the time to be profitable, and that\u2019s ignoring his actual equity in the hand<\/em>. I bet that raise clears the field more like 80% of the time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Let\u2019s do some turn math<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Suppose Mark makes it $150 on the turn. 80% of the time, everybody laughs at his enormous raise and folds. Mark profits $100 x 80% = $80. 20% of the time, he gets called by somebody. Let\u2019s agree that Mark isn\u2019t going to fire a second barrel on blank rivers because anybody willing to call a raise that big must be strapped in. So 20% of the time, Mark gets called and needs to get there. Of course, 80% of the rivers he whiffs completely, and his $150 turn investment is lost. So he loses $150 x 20% (the times that he\u2019s called) x 80% (that he whiffs the river) = $24 loss. Still, he\u2019s showing an $80-$24 = $56 profit for his $150 raise. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Ha, I see some of you out there waving your hands. You\u2019re absolutely correct \u2013 there\u2019s one little pie slice we haven\u2019t covered. That\u2019s where Mark gets called on the turn but then gets there <\/em>on the river. There\u2019s $325 in the pot, and Mark is likely to get a small bet called \u2013 let\u2019s say $75. This outcome is a long-shot \u2013 20% of the time he gets called on the turn, times 20% of the time he gets there on the river. So it only happens 4% of the time. But hey, that\u2019s 4% of the $400 pot he wins when gets there \u2013 another $16 in EV. So his total anticipated profit from check\/raising the turn is $56 + $16 = $82.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Note that when he calls the turn, as he did, he still gets there 20% of the time. And he probably wins a small bet on the river when he does. So his equity in the pot on the turn is 20% x $105 = $21. Maybe he can get a $40 bet called on the river when he makes his flush (noting it will be a one-card flush). So that\u2019s 20% equity in that extra $40 he\u2019ll get \u2013  $4. Thus Mark\u2019s expected win is $25, for his turn investment of $20, for a net profit of $5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"Lets<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

    It\u2019s a profitable call, but man, the fold equity and pot odds<\/a> of check\/raising the turn looks a lot<\/em> more profitable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    By the way, Mark didn\u2019t believe my \u201cYou clear the field 80% of the time with this 7.5x check\/raise.\u201d He felt the probability of success was lower. Of course, that\u2019s fine, and Mark\u2019s welcome to plug in his own percentage and see how the EV stacks up. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    However, I claim that the $20 bet and calls can represent a giant array of trashy hands. $20 is not a big absolute number in a $5 blind game, and folks are willing to pay that much for a lottery ticket to the river. However, $150 is a big<\/em> absolute number in a $5 blind game, and is likely to fold out everything except very big hands that are trapping. Since Mark is looking at the ace of trump, the most likely trapping hand (the nut flush) doesn\u2019t exist \u2013 80% is a perfectly reasonable estimate of ending the hand on the turn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    As played, to the river<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Of course, I didn\u2019t know any of this as I watched the hand play out \u2013 I just knew that when the river card was the 6\u2660\ufe0f, making the board 3\u2666\ufe0f-7\u2660\ufe0f-T\u2660\ufe0f\u20132\u2660\ufe0f\u20136\u2660\ufe0f, I thought, \u201cNow there\u2019s<\/em> a fifth street, right there.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Sam in the small blind checks, then Mark checks. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u201cWait \u2013 what? Mark checked his one-card nut flush?\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Yeah, I know. Everybody at the table, and the passing chip-runner, could see the four-flush on the board. I don\u2019t know why in the world Mark thought he was going to get a bet from behind him. Five people saw the river \u2013 did he think that a set or the queen-high flush would actually bet?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I really dislike Mark\u2019s check \u2013 when you make a one-card nut flush, you have to value bet<\/a> it for yourself. I would go for a chunky B60 ($75) bet, targeting the king or queen of spades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"To<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

    Of course, I say all that, but then the most L.A. thing ever happens: it checks to the button, who bets $30 into the $125 pot. This bet might as well have a giant arrow pointing to it saying, \u201cCheap bluff!<\/strong>\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    And that\u2019s when the hand turns weird. Sam, in the small blind, check\/raises to $130. When he did that, I thought, \u201cWell, there\u2019s<\/em> the ace of spades.\u201d But now Mark is contemplating his options, and I\u2019m all, \u201cWhat in the world is going on here?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Finally Mark calls<\/em>, and the button immediately folds (cheap bluff confirmed).

    Sam says, \u201cDo you have the ace?\u201d and turns up the K\u2660\ufe0f and some other card. Mark nods and tables his A\u2660\ufe0f6\u2764\ufe0f.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The aftermath, and monsters under the bed<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    This hand kept us busy at the post-game Vietnamese restaurant. With basil-infused steam wafting to our faces, I offered my post-mortem on the fifth street play.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I explained why it made no sense to check the river \u2013 there was an awfully good chance that it would check right through, and Mark would sheepishly table his hand. Maybe Sam would quietly slip the K\u2660\ufe0f into the muck and Mark would never know the value he missed. It was only because of the button\u2019s silly min-bet hopeless bluff, and Sam\u2019s \u201cadventurous\u201d check\/raise that Mark managed to get some extra added value for his near-nuts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Mark said that he was thinking about raising to $350 or $400, but he worried that maybe Sam had the dreaded 9\u2660\ufe0f8\u2660\ufe0f for the straight flush. He decided that he would try to bring in the button by flat-calling Sam\u2019s check\/raise, limiting his loss if Sam had the actual<\/em> nuts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Mark\u2019s poker buddy Don was with us \u2013 he and Mark got into a spirited discussion about whether Mark could fold if he made it $350 and Sam shoved. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I wanted to spray them both with sriracha sauce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u201cWe know that Sam has already, by definition, made a serious mistake. If he had exactly 9\u2660\ufe0f8\u2660\ufe0f, then he flatted a nine-high flush on the turn in a five-way<\/em> pot, knowing that any spade except the 6\u2660\ufe0f or J\u2660\ufe0f would almost certainly cost him the pot. If he didn\u2019t<\/em> have the straight flush, then he was check\/raising a hand no better than the king-high flush with a four-flush on the board.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \"Monsters<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

    Chopsticks waving for effect, I noted that combinatorically<\/a>, the likelihood of the latter error (over-valuing a non-nut hand) was much greater than him having the actual-two-exact-cards-in-the-deck nuts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Furthermore, the button was never calling. Mark was looking at the second nuts, and Sam the SB had just check\/raised the button\u2019s bet. The button was just the poor catalyst for the chemistry between Mark and Sam \u2013 his hand was two Target gift cards. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Therefore, Mark should have ripped his remaining stack in. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    All three of us agreed that when Sam check\/raised the river it was never<\/em> a bluff. Lower stakes players, such as Sam, do not check\/raise the river with the intention of folding. Mark was in an enviable, \u201cWelp, if you have the ace of spades, you have it and good for you\u201d situation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u201cBut what if Sam had the straight flush?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \u201cThen you lose 160 big blinds and good for Sam. Not going for stacks here is worrying about a rare monster under the bed. A unicorn monster.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I believe that my friend Mark, hoping to avoid a bad, but extremely unlikely outcome, missed a chance to get Sam\u2019s entire stack. Had Mark shoved, it would have been for Sam\u2019s remaining $645. Sam would be calling $645 to win a $1,060 pot. Remember, Sam had already check\/raised on the river \u2013 we know that he had already overvalued his king-high flush. Given the chance to see the showdown and win an absurdly big pot, it would have been awfully hard to fold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    One hand, three lessons<\/h2>\n\n\n\n